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Public goods from private data: An
effectiveness and justification dilemma for
digital contact tracing
Andrew Buzzell
York University
Debate about the adoption of digital contact tracing (DCT) apps to control the
spread of COVID-19 has focused on risks to individual privacy. This emphasis
reveals significant challenges to ethical deployment of DCT, but generates
constraints which undermine justification to implement DCT. It would be a mistake
to view this result solely as the successful operation of ethical foresight analysis,
preventing deployment of potentially harmful technology. Privacy-centric analysis
treats data as private property, frames the relationship between individuals and
governments as adversarial, entrenches technology platforms as gatekeepers,
and supports a conception of emergency public health authority as limited by
individual consent and considerable corporate influence that is in some tension
with the more communitarian values that typically inform public health ethics. To
overcome the barriers to ethical and effective DCT and develop infrastructure and
policy that supports the realization of potential public benefits of digital technology,
a public resource conception of aggregate data should be developed.
Keywords: privacy, AI ethics, big data, public health ethics, bioethics,
paternalism, digital contact tracing

The debate about the adoption of digital contact tracing (DCT) apps to
control the spread of COVID-19 has focused on risks to individual privacy
(Sharma & Bashir, 2020; Tang, 2020). The first aim of this article is to
show that this emphasis generates constraints which undermine
justification to implement DCT. The second aim is to argue that it would be
a mistake to view this result solely as the successful operation of ethical
foresight analysis (Floridi & Strait, 2020) or anticipatory ethics, preventing
deployment of potentially harmful technology. Privacy-centric analysis
tends to implicitly adopt a private property model of data ownership, which
frames the relationship between individuals and governments as
adversarial, entrenches technology platforms as gatekeepers, and
supports a conception of emergency public health authority as limited by
individual consent and considerable corporate influence that is in some
tension with the more communitarian values that typically inform public
health ethics. To overcome the barriers to ethical and effective DCT and
develop infrastructure and policy that supports the realization of potential
public benefits of digital technology, a public resource conception of
aggregate data should be developed.
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Contact tracing and COVID-19
Since the successful development of contact tracing as a tool to help
control diseases such as smallpox (Porco et al., 2004) and tuberculosis
(Begun et al., 2013), public health authorities have had the power to
compel individuals and organizations to provide data that can be used to
analyze the movements and behaviour of an individual diagnosed with an
infectious disease to identify possible incidents of transmission. Contact
tracing allows public health authorities to identify potential transmission
events and proactively attempt to limit further transmission with
interventions such as isolation. When a person is diagnosed, a public
health authority may interview them, ask for records such as transit and
banking data, and then attempt to reconstruct possible contacts with other
people that, given what is known about the disease, may have resulted in
transmission. These people are in turn contacted, and depending on the
nature of the specific disease, might be asked (or compelled) to undergo
interview, examination, or even isolation. Manual contact tracing is timeconsuming and treats individual data as a potential public resource, one
for which access might be negotiated or appealed even when public
health regulations might include powers to compel that data is provided.
On the other hand, automated or digitized systems must treat this data as
an always-on resource.
The virology of COVID-19 creates two kinds of scaling challenges that
make manual contact tracing unfeasible. The mode of transmission is
respiratory droplet spread, with some evidence of transmission via indirect
surface contact (CDC, April 2021), and the potential for aerosolized
transmission in some circumstances (Greenhalgh et al., 2021; Van
Doremalen et al., 2020). With a reproductive rate sufficient for exponential
case growth, this creates a horizontal problem of resource scale. In the
US alone it is estimated that at least 100,000 full-time contact tracers
would be required (Watson et al., 2020). The long period of incubation,
and the period of asymptomatic transmission in particular, creates a
vertical scaling problem where the amount of data required to conduct
tracing for each individual is quite large, encompassing a 14-day period.
DCT apps could mitigate the vertical problem by assisting recall through
recording high fidelity data for each individual that can be retroactively
queried to identify potential transmission. DCT apps could also mitigate
the horizontal problem by automating much of the contact tracing process
(Ferretti et al., 2020). Even without a vaccine, an effective DCT program
that correctly identifies transmission risks and mandates subsequent
actions (that are publicly accepted and generally complied with) that
prevent transmission could allow public authorities to relax some of the
severe restrictions such as stay-at-home orders and business shutdowns
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that have been imposed—an important counterfactual when considering
the justifiability of DCT programs (Mello & Wang, 2020).
Most DCT proposals use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) radio networking
technology present in smartphones and recording Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) measurements to determine when devices are
close together, and for how long. Unlike the tracking of GPS signals,
which identify the location of a device geographically, RSSI signals only
indicate that two devices have been in close range of one another. A
database of device pairings and RSSI information is maintained on the
device or a centralized server, and when one device is flagged as
belonging to an infected individual, an algorithm can select from the
database identifiers recorded while the individual may have been
infectious, filter them by duration and signal strength, and produce a list of
device IDs that might be targeted for intervention of some type, such as
testing or self-isolation.
As a sociotechnical system, DCT re-taxonomizes RSSI data as
predictions of disease transmission risk and recommends actions backed
by public health authority. Justification for the ensuing actions depends in
part on the reliability of the prediction. DCT faces serious effectiveness
challenges with both prediction and coverage, summarized in the
supplementary material. When the non-causal proxies for transmission are
too weakly correlated with actual transmission risks, or the individual or
population coverage is insufficient or uneven, DCT can't perform the
function of identifying infection risks effectively. While predictive problems
might be mitigated by improving technology and aggregating additional
data, coverage problems threaten the viability of DCT directly, and are
least amenable to post-hoc correction. They require populations be
persuaded to use the DCT app, and that hardware and software vendors
cooperate with public health authorities to resolve barriers to adoption and
usage, such as the need for software modifications to enable passive
RSSI measurement.

Effectiveness as a condition on justification
The exercise of coercive authority in the interests of public health is
typically justified by the harm principle (Upshur, 2002): that the action is
necessary to prevent harm to others. It is further limited by the principle of
least infringement (Childress et al., 2002): that interventions which
undermine privacy or autonomy must be the least burdensome alternative
sufficient to support the public health objective that is independently
justified by the harm principle. Effectiveness is therefore a necessary
condition on justification, and any modulation of measures taken in
response to other ethical concerns must maintain a level of effectiveness
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consistent with claims that the intervention is a viable alternative (Allen &
Selgelid, 2017). For example, evidence that the pervasive use of face
coverings in public significantly reduces interhuman transmission of
COVID-19 (Zhang et al., 2020) might justify the exercise of state power to
make them compulsory—a limitation of autonomy, but one that is relatively
low in costs and restrictions compared to alternatives such as mass
shelter-at-home orders. The effectiveness of the less-restrictive alternative
is high enough that the marginally better results from dramatically more
severe restrictions are offset.
If responsiveness to ethical or legal requirements constrains
implementation of DCT in ways that weaken its expected effectiveness,
this in turn undermines justification for persuasive and coercive measures
which aim to improve adoption. This might indicate a fundamental problem
with the proposed intervention. Because the predictions made by DCT
often trigger actions that further impact individual autonomy, such as
quarantine, effectiveness is particularly critical. Moreover, because DCT
has the potential to generate knowledge of risks that could save lives,
decisions that dilute this epistemic capacity are themselves ethically
salient (Dennett, 1986).

DCT and privacy
At a time of heightened public awareness of the privacy and security
challenges presented by the ever-growing trail of data generated by our
interactions with digital technologies (“data exhaust”), DCT has been
subject to intense scrutiny on privacy grounds. There is a growing
awareness that our data can be used in contexts that we would not
consent to, and which could harm our interests. We might agree to let an
app track our music listening habits to recommend playlists, but be
dismayed to learn it can be used to make inferences about our mental
health (Allen, 2015; Greenberg et al., 2016). Indeed, digital phenotyping of
aggregate data from wide range of sources can generate health data and
de-anonymize individuals. (Martinez-Martin et al., 2018; Sobhani, 2019).
Even where we might grant consent to use our data in one context of
analysis, interpretation, and action, such as infectious disease control, we
might not be able to foresee functions the data might be used for within it.
Similar problems with informed consent arise in the context of genetic
research (Lunshof et al., 2008), where uncertainty about usage
problematizes consent, a problem magnified under the sociotechnical
conditions in which digital data is collected and retained, which generates
very little friction to such re-contextualization and re-taxonomization.
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In light of these concerns, it is not surprising that many DCT models have
focused on privacy-by-design with strict minimization of data collected and
transmitted, strong anonymization, a prohibition of the use of additional
data sources (such as GPS), and policies demanding regular deletion of
data and restrictions on uploading data to central servers. Privacypreserving DCT models have been extremely influential, as evidenced by
the extent to which implementations have coalesced around privacypreserving standards (Chan et al., 2020; Li & Guo, 2020; Tang, 2020)
such as MIT's Private Kit (MIT, 2020), PEPP-PT (PEPP Team, 2020) and
DP-3T (Troncoso et al., 2020), and the extent to which technology
platform providers and health institutions (World Health Organization,
2020) have embraced this approach.

The exposure notification API as a theory of public health
authority power
Because the design of mobile operating systems prevents the passive
collection of Bluetooth data, the cooperation of vendors is necessary to
build effective DCT apps. The dominant mobile operating system vendors,
Apple and Google, jointly and rapidly developed the "Exposure Notification
API" (Apple & Google, 2020) to support limited DCT capabilities. This was
released as an update to mobile operating systems in order to afford
development of Bluetooth RSSI based DCT. Access to the Exposure
Application Programming Interface (API) is tightly controlled, and only one
app can be deployed in a country. The vendors can disable and remove
the app at any time. The app cannot use any data source except
Bluetooth RSSI data obtained via the Exposure API. The app cannot
transmit this data to a central server. The Exposure API provides a
methodology for the calculation of disease transmission risk which public
health authorities configure by setting some pre-defined values.
The structure of the Exposure API expresses and enforces a policy
perspective on the relationship between public health authorities and
citizens who use the products manufactured by Apple and Google. This
treats data as private property, frames the relationship between individuals
and governments as adversarial, entrenches technology platforms as
gatekeepers and offers a conception of emergency public health authority
as limited by individual consent and considerable corporate influence. This
is an unconventional view—historically, privacy is not a significant
constraint on manual contact tracing, and even strong legislation such as
HIPAA recognizes the legitimate need for public health authorities to
access protected health information (HIPAA 45 CFR 164.512)
Technology companies require a great deal of public trust to operate, as
do governments and public health authorities. Because of the need for
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cooperation with governments to build DCT, vendors are exposed to
highly publicized risks in the deployment of DCT, in terms of maintaining
trust and also in avoiding additional regulation. The privacy-preserving
model serves vendor interests, allowing them to cooperate with public
health authorities, thus avoiding regulatory or coercive measures by
limiting the possibility that the use of DCT apps breaks tacit or contractual
agreements with their users that could damage already wavering public
trust. (Newton, 2020).

Privacy-preserving DCT constrains solutions to
effectiveness problems
Critically, the Exposure Notification API prevents several actions that
might be undertaken to improve the effectiveness of DCT. Coverage
problems that relate to contexts where smartphone ownership or physical
possession is uneven could be partially remediated by aggregating other
data, as could the predictive weaknesses of RSSI. Including additional
data, such as location, would help avoid common scenarios where
exposures are repeatedly registered at testing sites, requiring further
testing leading to subsequent further exposure notifications. Several socalled “super-spreader” events have occurred in contexts where physical
possession of the device is unlikely, such as choir practices (Hammer,
2020). Analysis of the data exhaust surrounding such events could
indicate the transmission risks, even where Bluetooth radio proximity
would not.
However, this is also an example of a case where the possibility of
accurate and highly personal inferences from latent information in our data
raises fears of surveillance and concerns about how the access to
aggregate data could lead to personal harms. There are important
questions about who might be afforded access to such data, how this
would be controlled, and how its use can be confined to justified purposes.
While there are good reasons to fear that data could accidentally or
intentionally become available to be used for purposes which are harmful,
it’s valuable to consider the causes of these fears. There is a risk of a
“whiplash effect” (Mittelstadt & Floridi, 2016) where policy overreacts to
perceived risks of harms. But that there is a perception of risk (however
justified) is also a policy failure—that technology companies have not
been held to higher standards of accountability and trustworthiness has
created an atmosphere in which technological opportunities to pursue
public health objectives are foreclosed.
The aggregation of data, including GPS, on central servers where it can
be subject to further analysis and enrichment might also improve the
epidemiological value of DCT (Mello & Wang, 2020). Some countries have
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political, demographic, and cultural characteristics that might favour the
use of multiple apps, and data preservation may have future
epidemiological value.
If privacy-maximizing constraints on DCT undermine effectiveness, this in
turn can weaken justification to deploy DCT at all. One might conclude
that this is the correct outcome of ethical analysis of DCT: that it cannot be
used ethically because requirements needed to generate the effectiveness
required for public health objectives are unjustifiably invasive or coercive.
Alternately, one might wonder if this suggests that privacy-maximizing
analysis is problematic. It is somewhat dismaying that a public health
intervention that we have the technical means to deploy, which would be a
much less restrictive alternative to measures currently in effect, becomes
unjustifiable because of the restrictions necessary to ensure minimization
of privacy risks. In particular, the Exposure API’s restrictions on upload to
central servers for further analysis and the collection of GPS data—both
measures adopted to increase privacy—foreclose opportunities to enrich
DCT data in ways that could help to address effectiveness problems.
Concerns about security and mission creep are only accidentally
supportive of privacy maximization. While there are legitimate reasons to
think that the sociotechnical infrastructure DCT apps depend on are too
insecure to trust, these are generally not inherent but are instead the
results of implementation decisions. In practice, we are able to mitigate
these problems to support many sensitive applications. There will be many
examples of poorly implemented DCT, such as Qatar's which leaked
personal data in QR-codes (Amnesty International UK, 2020), but this
does not mean that secure DCT is not possible.
One might also worry that governments will misuse the data down the
road, but emergency public health legislation enacted in most jurisdictions
have strict limitations that we should trust to function as intended. Even if
we have upstream worries about the rule of law in some jurisdiction, this is
a distal problem, and not one that weighs in favour of the privacymaximizing view generally. In addition to legal constraints, the introduction
of citizen monitoring would help address these concerns, such as the
practice of co-determination in Germany, for example, where works
councils have the right to examine and oversee the usage of any
equipment that can be used to monitor workers (Gürtler & Höffler, 2005).

A prediction and coverage dilemma
The problem of effective coverage is one of trust and influence as much
as it is technical: adequate coverage and compliance depends in part on
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the public's willingness to cooperate. Discussion of DCT dominated by
privacy and security concerns and messaging that prioritizes the
protection of individual privacy both influence public opinion, shaping the
conditions of consent, which in turn affects the extent of coercive
measures necessary to encourage adoption of DCT. Some jurisdictions
plan to use choice architecture, such as defaulted opt-in, to encourage
adoption and avoid coverage problems, but choice architecture and the
theory of libertarian paternalism that underlies it depend on the absence of
strong preferences (Sunstein, 2015), and preferences can be shifted by
the exercise of soft power in the information environment. Because the
extent of the coercion is itself part of the justification calculus, changes in
public sentiment can impact justification.
An example of this relation between sentiment and justification is the
effectiveness of anti-vaccination information operations (Johnson et al.,
2020; McKee & Middleton, 2019; Wang et al., 2019) which lead to a
reduction in vaccine compliance in many jurisdictions, some of which have
responded by increasing coercive regulation. This would be a difficult
response to enact or justify if a majority of the population did not support it.
Anti-vaccination propaganda is often produced and amplified by state and
non-state actors that do not aim to improve epistemic outcomes, and often
intend or are ambivalent to harms caused directly and indirectly, and this
propaganda exists alongside and sometimes displaces the sincere
expression of concerns and hesitations by genuine discourse participants.
It can be particularly dangerous when it erodes a democratic mandate for
the very actions that would mitigate the damage, such as state-backed
evidenced-based messaging.
The dilemma which arises for DCT is that increasing privacy protection in
order to overcome constraints on justification undermines predictive
effectiveness to an extent that weakens justification to deploy DCT at all.
But to relax these protections to improve predictive effectiveness conflicts
with public sentiment (Milsom et al., 2020), creating resistance to adoption
that would exacerbate coverage problems, again weakening justification
on effectiveness grounds, but also increasing the justificatory burden
because implementation against public sentiment raises the stakes in
terms of autonomy impingement.
The remainder of this article explores a route to resolve this dilemma by
examining the conditions that make the privacy objections so difficult to
overcome.

Communitarian bioethics, principlist technology ethics
Public sentiment against impingements on privacy necessary for DCT is
grounded in legitimate fears of pervasive security problems with the
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sociotechnical infrastructure. The litany of security and privacy problems
with DCT applications that have already been deployed (Privacy
International, 2020) reinforce this. Even apps compliant with the Exposure
Notification API have been found to share data with other apps on the
phone (Reardon, 2021).
However, this sentiment is also shaped by an increasingly prominent
public discussion of technology ethics that is framed in a way that sits
uneasily alongside the values that inform public health ethics. A dominant
strain of technology ethics, exemplified by legal expressions such as the
EU's GDPR and California's CCPA as well as many AI ethics charters and
codes of conduct (Jobin & Vayena 2019), resembles a format in bioethics
that came to be known as "principlism" (Beauchamp & Childress 2001,
Clouser & Gert 1990). This is the view that a minimal set of principles,
usually autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice, supply the
analytical machinery needed to approach ethical problems. It is criticized
on the grounds that it does not specify an ordering, which instead is often
inherited from the context of application, which tends to privilege the
liberal individualist emphasis on autonomy, and which is unable to fully
articulate principles such as beneficence beyond self-interest. (Callahan,
2003). Applied technology ethics tends to generate trade-off dilemmas,
such as that between innovation and precaution, or between privacy and
public goods. As with principlism in bioethics, it does not supply a decision
procedure for conflict resolution. This is particularly challenging when
institutions that produce technological artefacts and systems struggle with
"...onboarding external ethical perspectives..." (Metcalf & Moss, 2019) that
conflict with tacit and explicit internal norms. Our underlying moral interest
in applied ethics demands more than compromise and consilience.
Rather, as Callahan puts it: "[s]erious ethics, the kind that causes trouble
to comfortable lives, wants to know what counts as a good choice and
what counts as a bad choice" (Callahan, 2003).
A primary criticism of principlism has been the extent to which it privileges
autonomy and individual choice—an explicit motivation in the germinal
work of Beauchamp and Childress. They criticized the “beneficence-based
model of health care ethics..” and aimed to shift it “in the direction of an
autonomy model, while also incorporating a wider set of social concerns,
particularly those focused on social justice” (Beauchamp, 2007). This
motivation stemmed in part from recognition that a great deal of ethical
problems in the health care context involve a lack of respect for individual
autonomy, such as the failure to allow patients to refuse treatment.
Callahan, even while critiquing the central role of autonomy, observes that
a virtue of principlism is that it is “culture congenial” with the individualistic
culture in which it emerged (Callahan, 2003). One problem with the
foregrounding of autonomy is that it comes into tension with the desire to
remain responsive to social justice concerns when these arise in contexts
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where balances must be found between individualistic goods and
community or population goods.
What’s particularly interesting in the context of building public health
interventions from big data is the extent to which concerns about
effectiveness and justice expose limitations of the autonomy-centric
ethical frame at a structural level. The institutional entities (mostly private
corporations) which capture, store, process, and apply big data sets
occupy positions of power that are inextricably bound up with a privateproperty model of data. Individuals in some limited sense “own” their data,
and grant custodianship to these entities in exchange for benefits they
value such as applications. This supports a “demand-as-blame” (Supran &
Oreskes, 2021) account of corporate action, paradigmatically illustrated by
the ways in which the tobacco and fossil fuel industries offer a framing of
their activities as merely responding to consumer demand, obscuring from
view the conditions that shape and generate this demand, and supporting
a narrative that prohibits “fundamental social change that would disrupt
the fossil fuel industry” (Smerecnik & Renegar, 2010). Likewise, the
sociotechnical imaginary of big data is one where the private-property
frame is implicit. Consumers demand that tech platforms collect and shield
their data from government, which creates structural barriers to the
realization of the potential of these data sets to promote public goods.
Privacy-first discourse has a tendency to embed this framing, obscuring
ways of thinking about aggregate data in ways that transcend the private
ownership model.
The "communitarian turn" in bioethics arose in part because capabilities
emerging in genetic research created opportunities for public goods that
could only be ethically realized once focus on individual interests yielded
to more communitarian principles such as solidarity and public benefit.
(Chadwick, 2011). Predictive genetic analysis that might benefit an
individual, their family, and their community—now and in the future—
exposes information that might be prejudicial to the individual's interests,
such as by interfering with their ability to acquire health insurance (Fulda &
Lykens, 2006; Launis, 2003). The extended value of genetic data over
long timelines and across unforeseeable applications problematizes the
coherence and applicability of autonomy protections such as informed
consent. An ethical framework that could motivate policy and regulation to
enable the pursuit of these opportunities for public good required the
integration of communitarian values.
The use of big data sets to power analytical technologies or to train AI
systems introduces similar concerns. Inability to detect and account for
bias and noise in data can cause the resulting technologies to operate in
ways that are unreliable, unfair, or ineffective. For example, a neural
network trained to perform diagnosis of diabetic retinopathy in a laboratory
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with high accuracy was unreliable in clinical applications: many patients
underwent imaging with equipment that lacked the high fidelity of the
images used in the training data (Gulshan et al., 2016), causing the model
to perform unreliably depending on where patients were located.
Technologies built with AI and big data are highly sensitive to the extent to
which data reliably represents the community where it will be deployed,
which generates bioethical concerns that are characteristically
communitarian in a way that is distinctive when compared to conventional
medical technology. The performance of AI technology can vary across
differing segments of the population in which it might be used and can
produce harms that cannot be predicted in advance. For example, a
widely deployed medical screening algorithm was found to systematically
underestimate the health risks of black patients because the algorithm
used future costs as a proxy for risk, and due to existing inequities, black
populations would be allocated fewer resources (Obermeyer et al., 2019).
Public health ethics introduces consideration of solidarity, proportionality,
and reciprocity alongside the four core principles of biomedical ethics
(Coughlin, 2014; Lee, 2012; Schröder-Bäck et al., 2014). The inclusion of
communitarian perspectives is necessary because policies and
interventions that support public health objectives by the very nature of
their concern with population-level goods can impose costs and burdens
on individuals that do not directly benefit them, which can expose the
limits of individualistic analysis that privileges autonomy. Communitarian
and distributive considerations could help resolve some of the ordering
problems principlist technology ethics inherits from the liberal individualist
context it operates within, which would help to resolve tradeoffs by giving
greater weight to shared values and common goods.

A public resource approach
If DCT cannot be deployed in a way that is ethical and effective, this is an
unfortunate loss of a public health opportunity. The barriers to remediation
run deeper than privacy-preserving technical measures and stem from the
need to develop a conception of aggregate personal data as a public
resource. We lack critical legal, policy, and technical infrastructure to
realize an alternate sociotechnical imaginary where the data exhaust from
our increasingly instrumented and networked activities can be fairly and
safely used in the public interest.
The Exposure Notification API encodes and enforces a privacy and
autonomy maximizing model of DCT, essentially privatizing a public health
policy concern. One justification for this is that corporations are enabling
their users to protect their personal property or adhering to a contractual
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obligation (Taddeo & Floridi, 2016). Traditional contact tracing treats our
personal data as a potential public resource with synchronous consent
and access procedures triggered by the identification of transmission risk,
whereas DCT treats it as a de facto public resource with always-on
consent and access. DCT provides public benefits based on data
collected from many individuals who might never have an elevated risk. Its
value is at the population level, and we would accept impingement on our
privacy for the good of the community. Although privacy is usually
regarded as a paradigmatically individual concern, communitarian
approaches to privacy (O'Hara, 2010; Floridi, 2017) argue that groups can
have privacy rights, and that privacy is fundamentally a common good
where its value and limits are in reciprocal tension with other community
values.
Technology companies profit from the value they extract from aggregate
data, which depends on pervasive access to individual data in ways that
have resulted in compromises of user privacy. Aggregate data is
exponentially more economically and informationally valuable than that of
individuals; it confers significant soft power to influence public sentiment
and hard power in terms of material control of data. But it is not clear that
the equivocation between personal data as the private property of an
individual, and aggregate data as the private property of the collector, is
justified. Napoli (2019) argues that "whatever the exact nature of one’s
individual property rights in one’s user data may be, when these data are
aggregated across millions of users, their fundamental character changes
in such a way that they are best conceptualized as a public resource." If
aggregate data is substantially and uniquely distinctive, this supports the
application of public trust doctrine, which is based on the idea that
“because of their unique characteristics, certain natural resources and
systems are held in trust by the sovereign on behalf of the citizens”
(Calabrese 2001), such as the protection of public lands and waters. In
some jurisdictions, public trust doctrine has been used to support claims
that the state is liable for inactivity and inattention in protecting public
resources from new and existing threats (British Columbia v. Canadian
Forest Products Ltd., 2004). Public trust doctrine applied to data as a
public resource would require the development of strategy and
infrastructure that could proactively protect this resource in the public
interest.
The exploration of a more communitarian approach to applied technology
ethics and the articulation and assertion of a public resource rationale
applicable to the data we generate by engaging with digital technology
and services could enable policy and regulation that would directly
address the barriers I have argued stand in the way of effective and
ethical DCT. Where policy and legislation such as the GDPR, especially
through the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) process, identifies
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and protects risks to individual interests, methodologies to identify and
protect opportunities in the public interest lag behind. Articulating an
alternative to the private-property model of data ownership and control is
an enabling condition for the realization of opportunities to use aggregate
data for public good and would act as a check on the centralization of
decisive power over public policy in the hands of multinational technology
corporations.

Supplementary material: DCT's effectiveness challenges

Inherent effectiveness challenges
The virology of COVID-19, so far as it is understood, makes the retaxonomization of Bluetooth RSSI data as COVID-19 exposure risks
problematic because the mode of transmission and infectivity is such that
there is only a weak likelihood that any particular contact detected by DCT
results in transmission, whereas for diseases such as tuberculosis or
HIV/AIDS, it is easier to identify exposure events with high transmission
probability. The contact/transmission link is also problematic due to the
potential for transmission via indirect surface contact.

Reliance on smartphones
There are socioeconomic confounders related to smartphone ownership
and use that will skew representation and the ability to install and update
DCT apps. Life patterns in some populations generate periods of contact
with others when smartphones are not present. Some forms of
employment generate a large number of contacts with others, which may
or may not actually correspond to increased risks of transmission.
Evidence for non-nosocomial transmission in Japan shows primary cases
in several contexts where smartphones are frequently not on persons or
are turned off, such as at music events and gyms (Furuse et al., 2020).

Bluetooth RSSI as a proxy for exposure
There are effectiveness problems with the core technology. RSSI
measurements map only weakly to transmission risk, because BLE radio
signals travel through walls and barriers used in public spaces to
specifically to prevent droplet spread. RSSI is stronger when we walk
side-by-side rather than following one another. It is weakened when
phones are in pockets or while sitting around a table, and is sensitive to
many idiosyncratic features of indoor environments (Leith & Farrell, 2020).
There are also considerable differences in RSSI measurement for different
devices and different mobile operating systems (BlueTrace, 2020), which
introduces socio-economic confounds.

Security
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Effectiveness can be further undermined by deliberate exploitation of
security vulnerabilities (Vaudenay, 2020). The public health value of DCT
is undermined by even simple circumventions, such as the display of
screen captures instead of running apps, as has been observed in India
with mandatory Aarogya Setu app (Clarence, 2020).

Individual and population coverage
At the population level, DCT apps would have to be in use by 60% of a
population (Servick, 2020) to be effective. This challenge led Singapore to
consider making their app mandatory, but the proposal was later
abandoned due to implementation challenges (Mahmud, 2020). Various
jurisdictions have considered opt-in, opt-out, and incentivization schemes
to encourage uptake.
At the individual level, coverage involves the extent of the individual's
activities and behaviours that are accurately captured by the DCT app.
Aside from issues related to smartphone ownership and presence
described above, mobile phone operating systems place limits on the
ways apps can access Bluetooth radios, often requiring apps be open and
in use. Even an individual who has installed the app and has their phone
at all times would produce little useful DCT data in this case. This problem
is in fact a critical barrier to effective DCT and requires the cooperation of
operating system vendors to remediate. Requiring users to keep their
phones open and the apps on-screen is not viable.
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